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Introduction
Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador have each seen a significant increase in extractive
industry activity over the last decade and a half. This raises many questions for
communities who live in the areas in which mining and hydrocarbon activity is
occurring. Among these, the implications for water resources and indigenous
resource governance are among the most significant. Water questions are also
of much concern for populations living downstream of that activity. Extractive
industries place pressure on, and introduce new risks for, the quantity and
quality of water available to rural communities and urban centres. Extraction
also poses threats to the de jure and de facto rights that communities have
historically exercised in order to access and control water resources and to
govern the territory in which they reside. 
These perceived and actual threats have catalysed organized responses as
populations have sought to protect their territory and their ability to govern
the natural resources within it. At times these responses have led to conflict and
violence. The anatomy of these responses varies from case to case. In some
instances, responses are led by federations of communities. In others, they
involve much wider alliances of actors who are rural and urban, indigenous
and not, national and international. There is also much variability in the
relative resilience and effectiveness of these responses. These different patterns
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of mobilization around extraction have transformed the social and political
landscape for water resource management in the region.
In this context, this chapter first gives an overview of recent patterns in
the extractive economy in the region and documents certain features of its
expansion. Second, a combination of maps and specific examples draws atten-
tion to some of the implications that this growth in extraction has for water
resources and indigenous territory. Third, the chapter discusses the socio-
political responses that have resulted, paying particular attention to the
diversity in the ways in which populations have organized themselves to
confront these new pressures. Fourth, one case is used to explore in detail the
alliances and tensions that exist within these supra-communal mobilizations,
the ways in which water and resource governance are argued over, and the
difficulty of finding ways to guarantee rights and avoid violence. The conclu-
sions then elaborate upon larger issues of governance that are raised by these
patterns of expansion in the extractive economy and the ways in which these
interact with processes of grassroots organization, alliance-building and
conflict.
Extraction, water and territory
Expanding extraction …?
The majority of mining concessions are on indigenous and
campesino lands. (Marlon Santi, president of the CONAIE, cited
in Moore, 2009)
On 21 January 2009, journalists estimated that some 12,000 people took to
the highways and byways of Ecuador in marches convened by the
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) to protest
against new mining legislation (Moore, 2009).2 Various arguments suffused
this mobilization and other protests that preceded it. Some draw on a national-
ist-left rejection of large-scale foreign investment in the resource sector; some
are inspired by commitments to human rights; others are based on convictions
that extractive industry constitutes an unacceptable invasion of (formal or de
facto) territories occupied and governed on a day-to-day basis by indigenous
and campesino communities; and yet others have a diversity of environmental
arguments that pertain, above all, to water. East of the Andes, earlier experi-
ences of the serious damage that oil expansion has visited on water courses,
indigenous territories and local organization (e.g. Sawyer, 2004; Fontaine,
2006; Ortiz, 2009) inform concerns that the same will now happen with
mineral expansion. In the sierra, experiences learned from Peruvian mining,
coupled with awareness of the geographical overlaps between mining conces-
sions and watersheds, nourish the fear that water supplies will be adversely
affected by mining’s needs for large quantities of water, as well as its removal of
water-bearing hill tops for open pit extraction. With people believing that the
new legislation – by and large endorsed by the industry – paves the way for an
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onset of large-scale open-cast mining, such worries about the security of water
resources facilitated fierce community mobilization.
This jump-in investment has already happened in Peru for both the mining
and hydrocarbons sectors, while in Bolivia it has occurred much more
evidently in the hydrocarbons sector than in mineral extraction (though there
has been a notable increase in mining investment post-2003).3 These
antecedents are known to Ecuadorian indigenous leaders and their allies and
are another significant source of unease. When the nature of this increased
investment is presented graphically it is not difficult to understand the reasons
for this unease. Let us begin with mining. Some experts in Peruvian non-profit
research centres have estimated that by 2006 over half of registered peasant
communities were affected by mining activity – mostly because of their
proximity to, or location within, areas that had been given by the state as
mining concessions. Figure 16.1 suggests why such estimates might be well
founded. The graph shows that since 2001, the number and area of mining
claims made each year have each increased significantly. Figures 16.2 and 16.3
suggest some of the spatial consequences of such growth – taking the example
of two different departments in Peru: Cajamarca and Piura. Cajamarca is a
consolidated mining department, as is abundantly clear from the spatial extent
of claims. Piura (discussed later in more detail) is a new frontier for mining; yet
even here a significant share of the surface has been affected by claims to
subsurface mineral rights. 
The images for hydrocarbon expansion – in purely spatial terms – are even
more dramatic (see Figure 16.4) (Finer et al, 2008). Around two-thirds of
Ecuador’s Oriente is subdivided into blocks for exploration and exploitation,
while in the Peruvian Amazon the figure is closer to three-quarters (between
2004 and 2007, the proportion of the area of the basin granted in concessions
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Source: based on authors’ data
Figure 16.1 The expansion of mining claims in Peru, 1990–2007
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Source: based on authors’ data
Figure 16.2 The expansion of mining claims in central-south 
Cajamarca, Peru, 1990–2008
Source: based on authors’ data
Figure 16.3 The expansion of mining claims in Piura, Peru, 1990–2008
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increased from around 14 to 70 per cent). In Bolivia the area is less extensive,
though still significant, and one sees the government promoting an important
expansion into Norte La Paz, Beni and Pando – all areas with no real hydrocar-
bon tradition. This is coupled with a further phenomenon of interest, the
setting aside of vast areas in the highlands of Potosí and Oruro (traditional
hard-rock mining departments) as areas of hydrocarbon potential. This process
seems set to continue as the current government seeks new sources of gas and
oil in departments that are more supportive of its political project than are the
eastern lowland departments from which most hydrocarbons are currently
extracted.
… and threats to territories and water?
Of course, not all concessions and contracts become mines or oil and gas wells,
so one has to be careful before extrapolating too much from such diverse
processes. Still, it remains significant that large parts of many of Peru’s major
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Figure 16.4 Hydrocarbon lots concessioned, contracted or subject to 
leasing in the Andean–Amazonian region
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drainage basins are now subject to mineral concessions: 41 per cent of the
Jequetepeque and Santa River basins, 40 per cent of the Rimac (which provides
drinking water to Lima), 26 per cent of the Mantaro, 31 per cent of the
Apurimac, and so on (Bebbington and Bury, 2009). Yet more important is that
concessions for hard rock minerals tend to be given in higher-altitude headwater
areas. Consequently, the impacts upon or risks for water are likely to extend
downstream. In some cases, concessions are given in areas that have already
been granted protected status as water sources for cities and communities. One
recent case of this is the Aguarague National Park in the Bolivian Department of
Tarija. The Serranía protected by the park is deemed to be the source of water
for an otherwise dry Chaco, home to Guarani and colonist populations alike
and, more generally, the Chaco woodlands constitute South America’s second
most important intact forest. Yet, during late 2008 and early 2009 it appeared
clear that the Bolivian government was going to allow Petrobras of Brazil to
begin a large-scale gas exploration programme, with seismic testing affecting
large parts of the park. Together with another PetroAndina project, the two
initiatives could run the entire length of the park. At the same time the govern-
ment was allowing a little known company, Eastern Petrogas of China, to begin
operating in the buffer zone of the park, where it will combine environmental
clean-up4 with exploration oriented to rehabilitating abandoned wells and
bringing them back into production by drilling down deeper. In the highland
department of Ancash, Peru, mineral concessions overlap with community-
controlled private conservation districts. Meanwhile in the Amazon Basin,
Ecuador’s government is considering allowing oil extraction in Yasuni National
Park, home to indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation,5 and a number of
hydrocarbon concessions in Peru to overlap with areas previously protected as
indigenous territory (as reflected by very influential maps produced during 2007
by the organization Instituto del Bien Común). It is not clear how much either
government worries about such overlaps. Indeed, Peru’s President Alan García
has suggested that organizations raising concerns about such phenomena are
little more than unreconstructed communists, and has gone as far as to suggest
that the concept of indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation is a
construction of activists determined to block hydrocarbon investments (García,
2007).6 As appalling as such arguments might be, it is hardly surprising that
authorities should seek to undermine the legitimacy of claims for indigenous
territory or simply refuse to grant new territory in areas of potential extractive
industry expansion. To bestow legal recognition on indigenous territories, and
give their governing organizations the power to manage environmental
resources, may be among the most serious complications that the expansion of
mining and hydrocarbons has to confront.
The two most contentious topics surrounding debates on the implications
of these patterns are water and indigenous territorial control. The experience
to date has been that extractive industry has had adverse consequences for
each. Large stretches of the upper reaches of the Mantaro River in highland
Peru have been devastated (Scurrah, 2008), while oil extraction has seriously
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contaminated Peru’s Rio Corrientes (La Torre, 1999; Goldman et al, 2007).
Meanwhile, mining companies have diverted water courses in order to access
the water they need for their production, leaving communities with diminished
supplies. And in the worst cases, some communities and peoples have been
doubly affected by both mining and hydrocarbon extraction. The Weenhayek
and Guarani peoples living along the banks of the Rio Pilcomayo in Tarija,
Bolivia, have seen declines in water quality and fish stock (fishing is central to
the livelihoods of many in these traditional communities) due to pollution from
mine tailings in Potosí, at the source of the Pilcomayo.7 At the same time, they
are now confronted by increased exploration for natural gas in their territories
and are concerned about the implications that this will have for their water
supplies. Indeed, in some sense the Bolivian case suggests just how serious the
threats to environmental integrity within areas of indigenous occupation are
because, notwithstanding the incumbency of a government committed to
indigenous empowerment, the sense remains that resource extraction blessed
by the government trumps all other considerations. Referring to a proposed
hydrocarbon development in a protected area near an original community
territory (TCO), one activist commented: 
I talked to the lawyer of [the indigenous organization] and he
told me that there is no place for opposition because of the
government and all its supporters, the colonists are against the
TCOs. Now it is hard to oppose the government and their oil
initiatives. It is probably harder than opposing a transnational oil
company. (Pers comm to one of the authors, 24 January 2009) 
… and must threats to water be threats to territory?
There is one final point to be made here. It is not merely that these patterns of
expansion threaten indigenous territorial integrity and water quality, or that
there are company and government strategies that evidently seek to subdivide
such territory (as when, in 2008, the Peruvian Executive tried to introduce
legislation to reduce the share of a community vote required to allow sale of
land to third parties). Perhaps yet more significant is that while one discourse
would insist that territory and water cannot be separated, the other consis-
tently tries to undermine any such coupling. For many indigenous and even
some peasant organizations, if a territory exists, then any discussion of the
management and ownership of water has to be conducted in relation to that
concept of territory. Water management thus becomes inseparably linked to the
governance of territory. Conversely, government and companies consistently
seek to separate the two. They might do this through natural resource-specific
legislation that treats the resource separately from the territory, or through
efforts simply to undermine territory. In either case, the effect is the same – to
produce water and land as alienable commodities, rather than as parts of terri-
tory. This alienation is, of course, essential if extractive industries are to be able
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to acquire the ancillary resources (water, land) that they need in order to make
use of the subsoil rights that the state has given them.
Decoupling territory and water can also be pursued through strategies that
undermine vehicles for the governance of territory. In order to be an operable
concept, ‘territory’ has to be governed, and for this to be possible social bodies
must exist that can do such governing. Thus, repeatedly one encounters efforts
to undermine those organizations that could play such a role. Governments
and companies question the legitimacy and representativeness of indigenous
organizations, and governments insist on granting concessions and contracts
without any real consultation with organizations even when legislation
requires this. Meanwhile many companies have encouraged the emergence of
parallel organizations or of conflicts within organizations (Bebbington et al,
2008; Molina, 2009; Ortiz, 2009). The effect of all this (intentional or not) is
not merely the weakening of organizations, but also the undermining of the
idea of territory as legitimately governable. This again has the effect of decou-
pling resources from territory, facilitating the transferability of water and land
and their transformation into commodities.
Federation and contestation 
The fact that expansion of extractive industry has induced organizational
responses within indigenous and campesino society is hardly surprising given
that, as Marlon Santi notes, concessions are disproportionately given to extract
resources in the subsurface of lands that are occupied by these peoples. These
organizations – new and refashioned – play various roles: they lead protests;
they pursue legal and advocacy initiatives; they serve as points of contact for
government, companies and international activists; they engage in public
debate on extraction, environment and development seeking to project alterna-
tive views of these relationships; they try to generate knowledge; and much
more. It goes beyond the purpose of this chapter to describe all of the differing
forms of organization through which populations seek to give voice to their
concerns regarding environment and territory in areas of extraction.8 Instead,
we focus on two levels of organized response – the national and the regional
(i.e. sub-national areas larger than municipalities) – and in each instance pay
particular attention to responses in which indigenous and community-based
federations and confederations occupy a central stage. At each level, however,
we suggest that most responses – and certainly the most effective ones – involve
some form of alliance and collaboration between such federations and a range
of other non-indigenous organizations.
At a national level, the effects of extractive industry have been addressed
for the most part by existing indigenous confederations: CONAIE,
Confederation of Kichwa Nationalities of Ecuador (ECUARUNARI) and
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon
(CONFENIAE) in Ecuador, National Organization of the Amazon Indigenous
People of Peru (AIDESEP) in Peru, and the Confederation of Indigenous
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Peoples of the Bolivian Oriente (CIDOB) and National Confederation of Ayllus
and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) in Bolivia. These confederations
emerged in earlier periods in order to address invasions and injustices visited
upon indigenous populations. As their activities evolved, a notion of territory
began to suffuse their approaches to the relationship between environment,
development and indigenous peoples – sooner in the Amazonian lowlands,
later in the highlands. Territory was a concept that simultaneously resonated
with ideas of history, resource governance and some degree of autonomy and
self-government. Ideas of territory inspired the notion that – for reasons of
history and of rights – indigenous peoples should govern environment and
development within the spaces that were historically their ancestral lands. This
has often led to difficult relationships with hydrocarbon and mining companies
as organizations have insisted that they should have the right – on the grounds
that this is their territory – to determine if, how and when extractive industry
should occur. This has often placed them in stark confrontation with a central
government that views the subsoil as the dominion of the state, a resource
whose use should be determined on the basis of national priorities, not local
preferences.
In some instances – such as that of Sarayaku in Ecuador – this has led to
years of standoff between coalitions of national and local federations, on the
one hand, and alliances of state and industry, on the other. In other cases, it has
elicited more or less explicit strategies on the part of industry and government
to undermine and divide these organizations through bribes, special favours or
the simple creation of parallel organizations (Sawyer, 2004). Indeed, there is no
doubt that at certain times both local and national organizations have been
severely weakened as a result of such interventions (Molina, 2009; Ortiz,
2009). 
While these arguments initially focused on the extraction of hydrocarbons,
they have been re-rehearsed around the more recent moves to expand mining –
and given that mining occurs primarily in the highlands, this has brought feder-
ations such as ECUARUNARI into debates on extraction when previously they
were far less visible in this area. Indeed, in some sense the mining debate has
helped to revitalize some of these organizations, allowing them to recover
somewhat from divisions previously created by efforts to divide them (as well
as by opportunistic and self-serving behaviour on the part of some of their
leaders).
The exception to these patterns is the National Confederation of Mine
Affected Communities in Peru (CONACAMI). CONACAMI is a relatively
young organization, emerging in the late 1990s with the specific purpose of
representing communities affected by mining expansion. Although initially
created as a coordinator of these different affected groups, it soon assumed the
mantle of a confederation with bases in regional federations (Regional
Coordinator of Mine Affected Communities or CORECAMIs). It addresses
issues of indigenous rights and resource governance, and pushes above all for
formal recognition of the right of communities to free, prior and informed
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consent before mining can proceed. It also lobbies for the establishment of
participatory regional and environmental planning processes prior to the
granting of any concessions. In pursuit of these ends its tactics have been many
and various: from pursuing legal actions and international arbitration in
conflicts, to direct action, public protest and participation in processes of
dialogue and negotiation. For a young organization CONACAMI has achieved
a great deal. Above all, it has helped to make the effects of mining on indige-
nous territory, resource management and livelihoods a topic of vigorous public
debate, and it has gained great national and regional visibility in the process
(Bebbington et al, 2008). 
Of particular interest is that CONACAMI (along with ECUARUNARI of
Ecuador) has also led an initiative to create a coordinating body of national
indigenous organizations in the three Andean countries – the Coordinadora
Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas. This reflects CONACAMI’s own move
towards ethnic-based politics, a process in which its leadership began to under-
stand the organization as explicitly indigenous. While this has created tensions
within the organization, because a good number of its bases do not share this
view, it has also helped to reframe some of the ways in which CONACAMI
presents the problem of extraction and the environment in Peru. Increasingly,
the organization has viewed this relationship as a territorial problem, rather
than a sectoral one. In some sense, then, the experience of extraction has taken
CONACAMI along a path leading towards positions already elaborated upon
by the other indigenous organizations. 
While national confederations such as these have played important roles in
making the effects of extraction a topic of national debate and political
discourse, their roles in specific local conflicts over mining, water and natural
resources, as well as in efforts to manage these resources, have been far more
modest. These more localized initiatives for territorial control and the defence
and management of natural resources have instead been led by supra-commu-
nal coalitions of membership groups, sometimes organized as formal
federations, unions or associations, sometimes as less formally networked
groupings (Bebbington 1996, 1997).9 Some such coalitions emphasize issues of
defence and resource rights, others lay more emphasis on resource manage-
ment for production; but whatever the case they play key roles in any initiative
to question externally driven resource management initiatives. They do so
because they have closer relationships with the local population and because
their own ‘representativeness’ adds legitimacy to their actions. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine that a process involving only non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) could gain much traction in debates on extraction and water because
they would be dismissed as unrepresentative outsiders.
By the same token, however, supra-communal groups acting alone often
have little leverage. Limits on their financial resources, comparative experi-
ences, information base, ability to generate and frame knowledge for public
debate, links to national and international entities and the like all constrain
their capacity to make a difference. Therefore, in most cases of disputes over
316 OUT OF THE MAINSTREAM
ES_OOM_13-11a  13/11/09  17:22  Page 316
water and extraction, one encounters diverse alliances. Patterns vary from
territory to territory. In some instances, one encounters ‘defence fronts’ which
are semi-formalized, citizen-based representative coalitions. In other cases the
situation may be more akin to a working group of different types of organiza-
tions, collaborating with each other on the issue at hand, but not bound
together in any formal sense. In other cases, coalitions are led (and often
dominated) by large international or internationally connected national
conservation organizations whose proximity to power, policy-makers and the
media often gives them the capacity to exert important leverage.10
One important dimension of such alliances is how far they bridge
rural–urban differences. Water issues – affecting as they do medium- and large-
scale settlements as much as rural communities – have the potential to link
rural and urban mobilization in ways that purely territorial issues do not
because territorial issues are of very little urban interest. Indeed, in many cases
where grassroots action has forced new debates on natural resource and water
extraction, it has been because the action was based on an articulation of
countryside and town (and often local government) which gave more leverage
than purely rural action and organization ever could. Examples here include
the (so far successful) efforts to prevent mining in the canton of Cotacachi in
the Ecuadorian sierra, and the (also so far successful) attempts to protect
Mount Quilish in Cajamarca from mineral development on the grounds that it
is the departmental capital’s main source of water (Bebbington et al, 2008).
That said, to sustain such coalitions is as difficult as it is important. The
differences between urban and rural priorities in other domains, as well as
ethnic and class differences, present a real challenge to those leading such coali-
tions – and in particular to leaders of supra-communal organizations. Indeed,
generally, differences within organizations and more so within social
movements are a recurrent source of cleavage and weakness. Within rural
supra-communal federations and associations one encounters differences in
economic interests, political party affiliation, environmental endowments, etc.
In addition, there are often deeply embedded local disputes among families and
neighbouring communities over boundaries, the use of common property and
so on. Likewise, one can encounter more distance than one would hope
between leaders and bases, with leaders sometimes coming from local power
groups who seek to use the supra-communal organization for their own ends
as much as for collective purposes. Companies and governments are, of course,
well aware of such weaknesses and cleavages, and are not averse to cultivating
and deepening them. Nor is opportunistic behaviour in short supply. In
disputes over extraction, natural resources and territory, federation leaders
have sometimes accepted payments from the extractive industry, the end result
being weakened organizations, split coalitions and extractive industry success
in securing control of the water and other natural resources. We have reported
on cases of this in Cajamarca (Bebbington et al, 2008). Ortiz (2009) notes
something similar among indigenous federations in lowland Ecuador, as does
Molina (2009) in Bolivia. While each of these three accounts remains highly
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sympathetic to such forms of organization, they also draw attention to their
potential fissures and self-destructive tendencies.
Mining, water and rural organization in Piura, Peru
While Piura is not yet a mining region, over the course of the last decade two of
Latin America’s most iconic conflicts over water and mining have occurred in
the department. The conflicts reveal much about the roles played by supra-
communal organizations in affecting relationships between mining, water and
territory, as well as about the potentials and limits of such organizations as
they play these roles. The first conflict occurred in an irrigated agricultural
export-oriented valley centred on the town of Tambogrande, the second in the
far poorer highlands of Huancabamba and Ayabaca (see Figure 16.2).
During the late 1990s and early 2000s a junior Canadian company,
Manhattan Minerals Corporation, sought to bring a gold mine to approval in
the town of Tambogrande and surrounding areas.11 The conflict that ensued
was especially acute because it pitched mining directly against human settle-
ment and export agriculture. The mine would have required resettlement of
much of the town and parts of the rural population, and would have damaged
a zone of successful, export-oriented, high-value irrigated agriculture that had
emerged as a result, inter alia, of earlier World Bank investments in water
supply and management (Bruno Revesz, pers comm; see also Cleaves and
Scurrah, 1980). The case thus lent itself to clear dichotomies: a private invest-
ment undermining an earlier successful public investment; a mineral
development landscape undermining an export-oriented landscape that
appeared both more economically valuable and more inclusive in employment
terms; a mine site displacing people from their homes; and an example of a
territory being submitted to contradictory development paths, each proposed
at different times by the same World Bank group.
The conflict escalated quickly and became violent. The main leader of the
coalition opposing the mine was murdered, and further escalation seemed only
to have been avoided through the implementation of a local referendum to
determine the future of mining in the area. This referendum was organized by
the local government and supported by national and international NGOs. It
enjoyed a turnout of some 27,015 people, roughly 73 per cent of eligible regis-
tered voters. The result was that 93.85 per cent voted against mining activity in
Tambogrande and 1.98 per cent in favour, the balance being abstentions,
spoiled ballots, etc. (Portugal Mendoza, 2005). This model of a public referen-
dum on mining has since been proposed and used by social movements and
activists in Argentina and Guatemala as part of their efforts to halt mining
projects.
The fact that contemporary land use in Tambogrande is still dominated by
agriculture and the prior urban settlement grid, and not by an expanding
mining sector, can only be explained by the emergence of a social movement
that culminated in this public consultation. But how did this movement emerge
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and achieve what it did? At the core of its success was the fact that it grew
from, and succeeded in building, bridges across a number of distinct social
groups in the region. In particular, it built bridges across rural and urban
groups, and also among both small and large export-oriented farmers, all of
whom had much to lose. In the process it also brought local government into
the movement, an involvement that was critical as it was this government that
had the strength to convene the referendum. Just as importantly, though, this
movement built links with actors in Lima and beyond. As the process unfolded,
activists in Tambogrande gained the support of a group of Lima-based advisers
(organizations and individuals) who operated as a technical committee to
Tambogrande’s social movement. The committee provided information, helped
with the studies that argued that Tambogrande would be more economically
productive as an agrarian landscape than as a mining area, helped with legal
issues and assisted in designing the referendum. They also played important
roles in making links to international actors in North America and Europe, not
only for advice but also for financial support, especially to fund the referen-
dum. Absent any one of these groups, Tambogrande’s current landscape would
likely be an emerging mineral landscape.
Just as the standoff between the population of Tambogrande and
Manhattan Minerals was coming to an end, another conflict began to unfold in
the highlands of Piura in the provinces of Ayabaca and Huancabamba. A
subsidiary of the then UK-based mining company Monterrico Metals (now
largely in the hands of a Chinese consortium, with minority shares held by a
South Korean company) began efforts to initiate exploration. It had acquired
concessions from other companies in the belief that beneath the soil lay a
world-class copper-molybdenum deposit. The existence of this deposit,
referred to initially as the Majaz project, and subsequently as Río Blanco, has
since been confirmed. It is part of a far larger copper belt stretching from
northern Peru into the southern and eastern provinces of Ecuador.
Monterrico’s concessions existed within the territory of two formally
constituted communities, Segunda y Cajas and Yanta. They are unusually
large, including both rural and semi-urban settlements, and are more
campesino than indigenous in their cultural and organizational form. Indeed,
the scale of the communities means that the levels of organization at which
most routine governance is conducted are the ronda campesina and the local
settlement. The ronda campesina is an organizational form that has been
particularly strong in neighbouring Cajamarca (Starn, 1999). It emerged as a
community-based mechanism for policing against cattle rustling, but over time
has become a more general vehicle for the administration of local justice and
the governance of the public sphere, including during Peru’s internal war (Starn
et al, 1996). Increasingly, it has become involved in the regulation of everyday
life (Diez, 2007). In practice, the rondas assume many of the functions of the
community at a local level. These rondas then exist in federated form at the
level of the provinces, a level at which they exercise significant social and polit-
ical influence, intersecting inter alia with municipal governance processes.
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All this notwithstanding, the existence of legally recognized communities
means that the expansion of mining activity in the area has to be in accordance
with legislation specifically related to the comunidad campesina. This presents
the company with the need to gain agreement from two-thirds of community
members in a notarized community assembly before it can go ahead with activ-
ities. This in itself is a complex task, given the size of the community and the
company’s own determination to move quickly. These factors, coupled with the
company’s poor understanding of local dynamics and its willingness to cut
legal corners, led the company to proceed with activities without securing this
agreement. The Ministry of Energy and Mines was complicit in this effort
(Defensoría del Pueblo, 2006a, 2006b; Red Muqui, 2009). 
For reasons that go beyond the scope of this chapter, this led to a situation
of increasing tension and, ultimately, violence in which two people were killed,
several maimed and injured, and in which levels of everyday insecurity
increased (Revesz and Diez, 2006; Bebbington et al, 2007). In these confronta-
tions, the rondas campesinas led efforts to prevent the mine from going ahead.
In the process, however, many more actors also became involved in a broad,
albeit uneasy, coalition questioning the modus operandi of Monterrico and the
desirability of the proposed mine. Local mayors aligned themselves with these
efforts, as did many of the departmental and national organizations who had
been involved in the Tambogrande conflict. Meanwhile, on the pro-mining
side, a similar convergence occurred notwithstanding the fact that a number of
private and government actors in the sector had certain reservations about
Monterrico’s behaviour. This was essentially a replay of the Tambogrande
struggle with the mining sector determined to use the project to open up Piura
to mining, and the campesino and social movement sector equally determined
to stop this from occurring.
Once again, different arguments were mixed together in the efforts of the
federations and their allies to stop the mine. One senses that the determination
to protect ‘territory’ and the power of the local population to govern it has
been a key motivation. Of almost as much importance – and of more impor-
tance in the public explanations of the reason for protest – have been concerns
about the implications of the proposed mining project for water resources.
Generally these arguments are pitched more at a regional level than at a
community level. Stated concerns include:
• the fear that contamination from the mine would run into local rivers that
pass through areas of certified smallholder organic coffee production and
so lead to the loss of certification;
• the fear that seepage from tailings would lead to local contamination;
• the belief that the mine would use large quantities of water that would not
only diminish local supply within the provinces, but also compromise
water running to the western arid lowlands where export agriculture
depends on irrigation water from the highlands;
• the belief that open-pit mining and the removal of hilltops would likewise
compromise water quantity.
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Casting arguments at a regional level has also been important (and in some
measure a conscious strategy) for building links beyond the locality. This is
important in facilitating alliances with other actors who might otherwise have
had little interest in a conflict occurring in distant comunidades campesinas.
The mining company has insisted that the rondas and, above all, the activists
and organizations who advise them simply have their hydrology wrong and do
not understand either the ways in which modern mining can avoid contamina-
tion or the structure of the regional drainage system. The company insists that
its activities could not possibly affect water running to feed coastal agriculture
and towns. It has been supported in this assertion by nationally eminent ecolo-
gists, one of whom has subsequently been named Peru’s first minister of the
environment.
Given that the company involved was registered in the UK and because of
the violence and claims of human rights abuses in this case, British solidarity
groups also became involved in this conflict (in particular, the Peru Support
Group (PSG) and Oxfam-GB). One effect of this was that the PSG organized a
delegation to document the case.12 The delegation’s report argued that while the
company was likely correct on the issue of drainage basins, the proposed project
raised a series of important issues for water quantity and quality. Acid mine
drainage effects had the potential to be significant; tailings and dams would be
located in tectonically active areas; high levels of rainfall significantly increased
the possibility of catastrophic slumping of tailings; the potential for contami-
nated surface runoff and subsurface drainage was high; and the mine was
proposing technologies that had not been previously used in Peru (Bebbington
et al, 2007; Bebbington and Williams, 2008). The report also argued that while
the single mine might not affect water running to the Pacific, there was evidence
to suggest that the company intended to develop a far larger mining district
which could affect west-flowing water. Red Muqui, the national network of
NGOs working on mining, human rights, environment and development, has
since referred to the PSG report as a hito importante (important milestone) in
the conflict (Red Muqui, 2009) in that it brought together a large body of infor-
mation in one third-party report, played an important role in making the case
the object of more visible public debate and suggested that the unit of discussion
should not be the single mine, but rather the mining district.
While the report was not a product of the federation of rondas campesinas,
it could not have been produced without their existence or the NGOs and
church groups supporting them. In this sense it was a product of the sort of
alliance we discussed in the prior section. It was grounded in the existence of
local federations, but neither limited to nor entirely controlled by these federa-
tions. Similarly, the subsequent evolution of the conflict hinged on the
existence of these federations. In some measure this evolution followed the
path charted by Tambogrande in that within a year of the report, the alliance
resisting mining in the region had also held a local referendum. While the
technical organization of the referendum was in large measure the work of the
national and international organizations within this alliance, the information
WATER, TERRITORY AND EXTRACTION IN THE ANDES 321
ES_OOM_13-11a  13/11/09  17:22  Page 321
provision and mobilization required to inform rural people of the referendum
and get them to participate in it was the preserve of the federation of rondas
and local authorities. 
The referendum concluded in a 92 per cent vote against the Rio Blanco
Project. Although legally non-binding and immediately dismissed as not
relevant by the government (Burneo, 2008), its effects have been significant in
that, at the time of writing, the final proposal for the mining project has still
not been presented to the government for approval. As the recent global
economic crisis has begun to influence the mining sector, the project’s new
owners have intimated that its onset may be delayed yet further (Reuters,
2009). The delay would give federations and their allies more time to work
through their arguments and their proposals for development alternatives for
the region. This is the biggest challenge because the political force of the feder-
ations’ case is lost if they are unable to link their arguments about water and
territory to a clear case as to why non-mining use of the land might be more
effective in fostering regional growth and reducing poverty in the area. If the
activists and federations lack well-grounded proposals for local development
alternatives, the pro-mining sector will continue to argue that they want to
keep people poor and to frustrate economic growth in Peru. Whether justified
or not, such arguments resonate widely.13
Conclusions
This chapter is written at a time of worldwide financial crisis that will cause
rates of investment in extractive industries to be far lower than they have been.
Mineral, oil and gas prices have all fallen dramatically and a number of compa-
nies will be reviewing their projects and putting some on hold. This may mean
that the immediacy of pressures on water resources noted earlier will diminish;
but it is unlikely that this will be long lasting. 
The maps presented in Figures 16.1 to 16.4 suggest that the most impor-
tant challenge facing indigenous communities who want to protect their water
resources and territory is finding ways to ensure that regulation of extractive
industries and water resource management are treated jointly. In many of the
interviews, indigenous and campesino leaders suggested that current systems
that prioritize extraction are attributable to ministers and presidents who
believe that producing gas and copper are more important than protecting
water resources.
The existence of so much conflict and mobilization around the relation-
ships between extraction, water and territory, and the need for indigenous and
campesino groups to federate and build alliances in order to continue living in
their own territories and practising their own livelihoods, reflects the failure of
regulation. Conflict occurs not because of the action of cuatro pelagatos (four
nobodies) as Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa suggests (Moore, 2009), or
because rural leaders are terrorists and environmentalists or former commu-
nists turned green, as Peru’s President Alan García and parts of the Peruvian
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legal system have suggested (García, 2007). Instead, it occurs because commu-
nities ultimately conclude that formal democratic and bureaucratic procedures
do not allow them to express their concerns, far less receive any response to
them. It is also because political parties fail to embrace these citizen concerns.
Protest, federation and mobilization are default phenomena, a consequence of
weak, inoperative or corrupt institutions. And lest it be assumed that having an
Aymara president necessarily resolves this situation, we need only refer back to
one of the cases noted earlier in the chapter. The Bolivian government was
apparently willing to endorse massive gas exploration by a transnational firm
inside a protected area that would infringe on claimed indigenous territory and
threaten the main source of water for rural and urban settlements in an arid
and ecologically fragile region. Notwithstanding claims that one can trust the
state because its approach to the subsoil will be informed by a respect for
Pachamama,14 it would seem that the part of Pachamama that has been
deemed most worthy of respect is that which is best able to generate resources
for public investment and macro-economic stability.
To change the rules of the game as well as the culture that underlies both
the practice of government and the exercise of executive power is a huge
challenge. Grassroots federation is an important element of responding to this
challenge and protecting the natural resource base and livelihoods of rural and
indigenous communities. However, it is far from being a sufficient vehicle for
changing the rules of the game and the ways in which this game is played such
that indigenous and citizen rights of access to water, resources and self-gover-
nance are guaranteed. Even constitutional change may not be enough. The
protests occurring in Ecuador respond to a new law that indigenous and other
organizations claim allows forms of mining that will threaten the sanctity of
water resources. Yet, this occurred just four months after the country approved
a constitution that is supposed to give nature enforceable rights, and recognize
access to water as a basic right of citizenship. Whether these organizations are
right or wrong in their interpretation of the law, the determination of the
Ecuadorian executive to push the legislation through without consultation,
while writing off CONAIE as irrelevant, suggests that constitutional change,
no matter how apparently progressive, will do little to protect water rights
while political power continues to be inflected with authoritarianism and while
nature continues to be automatically subsumed to ‘economy’ in the name of
fiscal imperative. 
The issue of protest and rural social mobilization around water and natural
resources challenges state formation and public culture. The apparent slippage
between constitutional assertion and executive fiat in Ecuador is one of state,
showing that the institutions of the state are not sufficiently strong and
independent to protect rules from executive infringement. The cultural
challenge is to get the public to demand a strengthening of these institutions
and greater respect for the values underlying community rights to resources. 
There is cause for optimism that comes from Peru which might be consid-
ered the least favourable of the three countries for the protection of indigenous
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rights and water resources in the face of extractive industry. One of the jewels
of the Peruvian state is the Ombudsman’s Office, the Defensoría del Pueblo.
The Defensoría is charged with ensuring that government action and policy do
not infringe citizenship rights as enshrined in Peruvian law and commitments
to international treaties. The Defensoría has played a critical role in a series of
conflicts around indigenous and rural people, water and extractive industry
much to the annoyance of the government. It has been the one part of the state
from which federations and broader alliances have been able to elicit responses
and in which they have had confidence in a range of conflicts over extraction
and water. That said, the Defensoría’s credibility must be understood in the
context of the federations and alliances for it is partially the product of them.
First, the ability of the Defensoría to do this work has been made possible
because of supplementary funding received from donor organizations that have
also supported some of the alliances and mobilizations discussed earlier.
Second, the disposition of the Defensoría to act on these issues has emerged
because of the nature of its staff, who are increasingly composed of young well-
trained lawyers who are committed to the ideals of their profession rather than
to partisan projects, and a sub-group of whom are particularly committed to
the issues raised by socio-environmental conflicts. Third, the Defensoría must
act on issues when requested to do so. In many cases formal requests made by
federations and their allies to investigate cases are the triggers that have
brought the Defensoría’s professional capacities and public legitimacy to bear
on these issues of extraction and water rights.
The case of the Defensoría del Pueblo in Peru illustrates the vital role that
competent, autonomous and legitimate public institutions have to play in
guaranteeing and protecting community rights, including the rights of access to
water, territory and a healthy environment. It also reminds us that the
challenge of institutional change, of more rational regulation and of state-
making goes beyond what federations and their allies can achieve through their
particular actions around water and extraction. But such actors do have a criti-
cally important role in bringing a more rational rights-oriented state into being.
Notes
1 This chapter is based on research supported by grants from the Economic and
Social Research Council (ESRC) (RES-051-27-0191); ESRC Department for
International Development (RES-167-25-0170); the National Science Foundation
(BCS-0002347); and an ESRC/SSRC Fellowship, for which we are extremely
grateful. The ESRC supports the programmes Territories, Conflicts and
Development (www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes) and Social Movements
and Poverty (see www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/socialmovements), each
based at the University of Manchester.
2 Journalist Jen Moore is a collaborator in the above-mentioned Territories,
Conflicts and Development research programme. 
3 Increase in international investment in mining in Bolivia has been on a far more
modest scale – in part, perhaps, because there is a strong cooperative sector in the
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sector that owns many of the concessions (this was part of the arrangements when
mines belonging to the state mining company, COMIBOL, were closed in the mid
1980s).
4 This area has been seriously contaminated because in periods prior to the park’s
creation the state oil company had operated here. When it departed it left well
heads open with a steady flow of oil into the soil and watercourses. 
5 This is an almost iconic case. On election, Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa went
to the international community asking them to pay Ecuador compensation for
leaving Yasuní’s oil in the ground. This discourse continues to the present; but at
the same time the government talks with companies about possible development of
these fields. 
6 In the first of three articles in the leading national newspaper El Comercio,
bemoaning the ‘perro del hortelano’ blocking all forms of development in Peru, he
wrote ‘against oil, they [activists] have created the figure of the non-contact,
forest-dwelling native’ (García, 2007). 
7 A mine owned by the twice, and now disgraced, former President Gonzalo Sánchez
de Lozada.
8 For cases see: Cidse/ALAI (2009); Broederlijk-Delen/ALAI (2008); Sawyer (2004);
Bebbington (2007); Ortiz (2009); Molina (2009).
9 Libia Grueso, Colombian activist, has referred to these as coalitions of los dolidos
(the hurt ones), those persons directly affected and harmed and without whom
there could be no effective campaign to confront the adverse effects of extraction.
10 Although at the same time these close links to power and money have often led
these organizations to assume more politically cautious positions for which they
have been severely criticized at times (Chapin, 2004). 
11 The following three paragraphs draw on Bebbington (2008).
12 Anthony Bebbington led this delegation, which also included a hydrologist, an
anthropologist, a leading international journalist and a British member of
parliament (see Bebbington et al, 2007).
13 The Ecuadorian case is an illustration of how complex the issues at stake are.
Following the discovery of oil in the 1960s, Ecuador built up social and
development programmes on the basis of income from hydrocarbon extraction,
and subsequently from loans leveraged against anticipated future income from oil.
This was, then, a transfer from natural resource extraction to social investment. As
oil income has declined the government needs alternative sources to fund social
programmes. In the process it has looked once again to resource extraction, this
time mining, to fill this gap – social programmes are to be funded through
economic activity that threatens water resources on or around indigenous territory.
This elicits protest. Yet it is also the case that the same indigenous confederations
protesting against extraction also protest against efforts to increase the retail price
of gasoline and against cutbacks in social programmes. In this sense, indigenous
confederations are also far from consistent in these debates about exactly how
Ecuador wants to manage its resources. Similar slippages are also apparent in
Bolivia, where actors who played an important part in the Guerra del Gas in 2003
were by 2005 part of a governing coalition. Notwithstanding their rhetoric of
nationalism, that coalition is now allocating contracts to transnational hydrocar-
bons companies with less than responsible histories of behaviour in indigenous
territories elsewhere in the world.
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14 Claims made to the first author by Bolivian MP and President of the Congressional
Committee for Constitutional Affairs Renee Martínez in response to a question
during a public forum at the conference Latin America 2008: Making a Better
World Possible, 6 December 2008, London.
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